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Notes and Comments
Sexual Pattern: Why a Pattern or
Practice Theory of Liability is not an
Appropriate Framework for Claims of
Sexual Harassment
[Tihe notion of a "sexual harassment class action" is an
oxymoron. By their nature - indeed, by definition - sexual
harassment claims usually only can be resolved case by
case, plaintiff by plaintiff. The elements of the cause of ac-
tion demand individualized treatment.'
INTRODUCTION
The class action theory of "pattern or practice" liability has
recently been extended by some federal trial courts to claims of
sexual harassment. 2 Despite the intrinsically individualized na-
ture of sexual harassment claims, these courts have held that a
pattern or practice theory of liability is an appropriate framework
to pursue claims of sexual harassment.3 This extension of the pat-
1. Kenneth M. Willner et al., Multiplaintiff Litigation and Class Ac-
tions: A Defense Perspective, in LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 158,
158 (Matthew B. Schiff & Linda C. Kramer eds., 2d ed. 2000).
2. See EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2001);
EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1069 (C.D. Ill.
1998); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 861 (D. Minn. 1993).
The class action theory of "pattern or practice" liability refers to cases of
broad-scale discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national
origin. See Willner et al., supra note 1, at 168. The pattern or practice theory
is an efficient means of handling the prima facie and pretext issues for the
individual claims being aggregated in such cases. See id.
3. See Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 934; Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am.,
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tern or practice theory has resulted in substantial settlements
over the past few years between employers and classes of plain-
tiffs claiming that they have been victims of sexual harassment at
their workplace. 4 While several federal district courts have ruled
on certain issues in sexual harassment pattern or practice cases,5
few cases have reached trial because, like all class action claims,
"[t]he procedure for litigating pattern or practice cases is... cum-
bersome and expensive." 6 The expense and possible repercussions
of litigating these claims are so overwhelming that they frequently
settle before reaching trial.7 In addition, the issue of whether sex-
ual harassment cases can proceed under a pattern or practice
framework has yet to reach the Supreme Court, and has received
virtually no attention in the federal courts of appeals.8
990 F. Supp. at 1069; Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 861.
4. See, e.g., Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission(EEOC), Judge Grants EEOC's and Dial's Request to Enter Joint Consent
Decree in Harassment Case (Apr. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-29-03.html (announcing that the parties reached
a settlement involving Dial paying $10 million); Press Release, EEOC, Mit-
subishi Motor Mfg. and EEOC Reach Voluntary Agreement to Settle Har-
assment Suit (June 11, 1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/6-11-
98.html (announcing a $34 million settlement reached between Mitsubishi
Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc. and the U.S. EEOC); see also Settlement Ends
Women's Class Action Against Eveleth Mines in Minnesota, 12 Employment
Discrimination Rep. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 6, 1999); EEOC Reaches $1 Million Set-
tlement of Claims Against Supermarket Chain, Employment Policy and Law
Daily News (BNA) (Nov. 3, 1998); Female Casino Workers File Class Suits
Against Three Chicago-Area Gaming Places, Employment Policy and Law
Daily News (BNA) (July 24, 1998); Judge Approves $1.9 Million Settlement
for Female Dockworkers in Tacoma, Washington, Employment Policy and
Law Daily News (BNA) (Jan. 2, 1998); Judge Approves $635,000 Suit Against
California Agency, Employment Policy and Law Daily News (BNA) (Aug. 19,
1997); Corrections Workers Awarded $1.4 Million on Sex Harassment and Re-
taliation Claims, Employment Policy and Law Daily News (BNA) (Apr. 27,
1995).
5. See supra note 3. The issues that trial courts have ruled on in these
cases originated based on defendants' motions for summary judgment. All
trial courts that have decided these issues held that a pattern or practice
framework was an appropriate framework for bringing sexual harassment
claims. See Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 934; Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am.,
990 F. Supp. at 1069; Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 861.
6. Michael Delikat, "Pattern or Practice" Discrimination Litigation, in
LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & SExuAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
2003, at 47, 55 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-
693 2003).
7. Id. at 55.
8. See id.
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This Comment argues that the precedent set by the federal
trial courts extending a pattern or practice theory of liability to
sexual harassment claims should not be followed because of the
inherently individualized nature of sexual harassment claims, and
the procedural problems involved with bringing such claims.
These procedural problems include: (1) The tensions in private
class actions that plaintiffs have in meeting Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; 9 (2) Proving allegations of specific con-
duct in sexual harassment cases as opposed to using statistical
data as in traditional pattern or practice cases;10 and (3) Whether
it is appropriate to shift the burden of proof to the defendant in
the second phase of a sexual harassment pattern or practice
case." When considering the inherently individualized nature of
sexual harassment claims and these procedural problems as a
whole, it is evident that a pattern or practice theory of liability is
an inappropriate framework for bringing sexual harassment
claims.
Part I of this Comment analyzes the traditional approach to
pattern or practice litigation and discusses Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 2 the seminal case in the area of pattern or prac-
tice litigation.13 In Part II, Title VII and the origin of sexual har-
9. Currently, there is a split among the circuit courts as to whether a
class of plaintiffs seeking monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). See id.; Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.,
267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d
402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998). Moreover, it is much more difficult to certify a class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2),
(3).
10. This raises questions as to whether sexual harassment claims are
appropriate for pattern or practice treatment because of the number of indi-
vidual issues involved, including the severity or pervasiveness of the harass-
ment, the affirmative defenses to claims of sexual harassment, the subjective
unwelcome nature of harassment claims, and the issue of employer liability.
11. Traditional pattern or practice cases shift the burden to the defen-
dant in the second phase of the proceeding. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362 (1977). However, in individual sexual har-
assment cases a plaintiff must prove that the alleged conduct was subjec-
tively unwelcome. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
Shifting the burden of production regarding this issue raises questions as to
the fairness of the proceeding. This is especially true where plaintiffs may not
have to prove an essential element of the cause of action, as they would if
they had brought the claim on an individual basis.
12. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
13. Pattern or practice cases under Title VII allege group-wide acts of in-
2005]
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assment law is discussed, and the requirements for a prima facie
sexual harassment case are analyzed with special attention paid
to the inherently individualized nature of such claims.14 In Part
III, pattern or practice sexual harassment cases are discussed, in-
cluding Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.,'5 EEOC v. Mitsubishi Mo-
tor Manufacturing of America, Inc.,16 and EEOC v. Dial Corp.17
Part IV analyzes why a pattern or practice framework is not an
appropriate vehicle for bringing sexual harassment claims, and
why the approaches taken by trial courts that have decided issues
in sexual harassment pattern or practice cases are incorrect.
I. PATTERN OR PRACTICE LITIGATION
The theory of pattern or practice liability originated in cases
of "broad-scale discrimination" where a class of plaintiffs was
seeking injunctive relief.18 Prior to the amendments to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, all relief under Title VII, including
back-pay relief, was considered equitable in nature.19 Before 1991,
pattern or practice theory was an efficient way to aggregate indi-
vidual claims and handle the prima facie issues involved in those
claims. 20 The 1991 amendments, however, allowed plaintiffs to
seek compensatory and punitive damages, and allowed for jury
trials in cases of intentional discrimination.21 The additional
remedies that the 1991 amendments introduced have complicated
Title VII litigation in general because of the greater complexity of
tentional discrimination. These cases "are generally divided into two phases:
liability and remedial." Meghan E. Changelo, Reconciling Class Action Certi-fication with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 36 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 133,
136(2003).
14. In Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Su-
preme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive
work environment. Id. at 66. The Meritor Sav. Bank Court laid out the
framework for establishing a prima facie sexual harassment case. Id. at 64-
66.
15. 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
16. 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
17. 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
18. Delikat, supra note 6, at 55.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III 1991)). This amendment became effective on
November 21, 1991. 105 Stat. at 1099, 1100.
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individualized issues involved with those remedies.
The pattern or practice theory of liability has been an essen-
tial tool in combating widespread, institutional discrimination.22
This approach to litigation has become such an indispensable as-
pect of class litigation for discrimination claims because the com-
monality necessary under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is often satisfied by establishing a pattern or practice of
discrimination. 23 However, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has the ability to litigate pattern or practice
claims as a representative of the class without meeting the re-
quirements of Rule 23, even though pattern or practice cases par-
take of most of the aspects of class litigation.24
Pattern or practice cases under Title VII claim that an em-
ployer has intentionally engaged in a pattern or practice of dis-
crimination against a protected group. 25 "These claims are
generally divided into two phases: liability and remedial."26 The
liability phase involves establishing proof of a pattern or practice
of discrimination by the employer.27 Traditionally, pattern or prac-
tice cases have involved objectively measurable facts of employ-
ment selection or exclusion. 28 Generally, in those cases, actions
that are readily identifiable (e.g., hiring, promotions, transfers)
22. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir.
1998) ("[W~e have recognized that the class action device could be imple-
mented effectively to eradicate widespread or institutional-scale discrimina-
tion.").
23. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a private class of plain-
tiffs must meet four prerequisites in order to be certified. See FED. R. CIv. P.
23(a). One of these prerequisites is that there are questions of law or fact that
are common to the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000).
25. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329
(1977).
26. Changelo, supra note 13, at 136; see, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel
Serv. of Am., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 358 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (bifurcating the trial
and severing the liability and damages phases of the litigation); Griffin v.
Home Depot, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 187, 191 (E.D. La. 1996) (separating the trial
into two phases where the first determines class-wide damages and injunc-
tive relief and the second resolves individual compensatory damage claims);
Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 70 Fair Employment Practice Cases (BNA) 51,
55-56 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (opting to bifurcate liability and damages phase of
trial).
27. Changelo, supra note 13, at 136.
28. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329; see also Changelo,
supra note 13, at 136.
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are typically the basic information subjected to pattern or practice
analysis. 29 An employer will be found liable if there "is a statisti-
cally significant difference between the actual and 'ideal' treat-
ment of a protected group."30 Such a showing of liability engenders
a presumption that each individual in the protected class was af-
fected by the pattern or practice of discrimination. 31 Upon the es-
tablishment of a pattern or practice of discrimination, in most
cases, the burden of any individual plaintiff is reduced to showing
simply that he or she is a member of the class affected by the pat-
tern or practice of discrimination, and that he or she has incurred
damages as a result thereof that can be proven. 32 Once a court de-
termines that an employer is liable because there is a pattern or
practice of discrimination in the workplace, a presumption arises
that every member of the class is entitled to relief in the remedial
phase.33 The burden of going forward then shifts to the employer
"to establish that the challenged employment practice serves a le-
gitimate, non-discriminatory business objective."34 Thus, this pre-
sumption entitles each individual class member to relief unless
the employer can demonstrate that its action toward an individual
class member was not related to its policy of discrimination. 35 Any
nondiscriminatory reason offered by the employer is then subject
to rebuttal by the individual plaintiff that the justification was ac-
tually a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 36
A. Phase I: The Liability Phase, Proving a Pattern or Practice
In the liability phase of the proceeding, plaintiffs must show
that "a policy, pattern, or practice of intentional discrimination
29. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
30. Changelo, supra note 13, at 136. Changelo also cites Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), stating that the judges in that
case "not[ed] [that] 'a fluctuation of more than two or three standard devia-
tions would undercut the hypothesis that decisions were being made ran-
domly with respect to race." Id. at 136 n.15 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist.,
433 U.S. at 312 n.17 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17
(1977))).
31. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (11th Cir.
2000).
32. See id. at 1276.
33. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.
34. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1275.
35. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.
36. See id.
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against a 'protected group,'"37 or against a "protected class,"38 ex-
isted. In Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,39 the Supreme
Court established the framework for bringing a pattern or practice
lawsuit. In that case, the Attorney General brought suit on behalf
of the government alleging that the Teamsters Union and a truck-
ing company had engaged in a pattern of discriminating against
blacks and Hispanics. 40 The Attorney General argued that dis-
crimination was present because blacks and Hispanics who had
been hired were placed in lower paying, less desirable jobs, and
were later discriminated against with regard to promotions and
transfers.41 The Supreme Court held that in order to prove a pat-
tern or practice of discrimination, the government must demon-
strate more than isolated or sporadic discriminatory acts.42 The
government must establish "that racial discrimination was the
company's standard operating procedure - the regular rather than
the unusual practice." 43 In addition, the Court quoted Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey's remarks from the Senate floor regarding
Title VII: "[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the
denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, spo-
37. Changelo, supra note 13, at 136.
38. "Protected class" refers to a class of people (for purposes of this Com-
ment, employees) who face discrimination because of their race, sex, religion
or national origin. BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 266 (2004).
39. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
40. Id. at 328-29. The Attorney General brought suit under section 707(a)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that
any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this
title,... the Attorney General may bring a civil action.., requesting
such relief.., as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of
the rights herein described.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707(a), 78 Stat. 261-62 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2000)); see Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 328. Section 707 was amended by Section 5(e) of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972 to give the EEOC, rather than the Attor-
ney General, the authority to bring "pattern or practice" suits under that
section against private-sector employers. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 261-62 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
6(a) (2000)), amended by Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 5(e), 86 Stat.107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-6(c) (Supp. V 1970)).
41. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
42. Id. at 336.
43. Id.
2005]
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radic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized na-
ture."44
In Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, the government relied on strong
statistical evidence to demonstrate that discrimination against
blacks and Hispanics was the standard operating procedure. 45 At
the time that the government filed its complaint, the company
employed 6,472 employees: 314 (5%) were black, and 257 (4%)
were Hispanic. 46 However, only eight of the 1,828 higher paid line
drivers (0.4%) were black, and only five (0.3%) were Hispanic.47
Moreover, all of the African-American line drivers were hired after
the Attorney General filed the action.48 In addition to its statisti-
cal evidence, the Attorney General also offered testimony from
employees who cited over forty specific instances of discrimina-
tion.49 The Court found that the government had proved, through
its statistical evidence and the individual testimony, that blacks
and Hispanics were discriminated against. 50
The importance of a strong statistical showing to establish a
prima facie case of pattern or practice discrimination is high-
lighted in several older cases. In Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight
Inc. '51 the court utilized statistical evidence to establish a prima
facie proof of a pattern or practice. 52 The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that statistics have
the ability to be more powerful than the testimony of several wit-
nesses, and that they should be accorded proper weight by the
courts.53 Similarly, in Sagers v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.,54 the
plaintiffs utilized statistical information to demonstrate an over-
whelmingly disparate treatment of minorities. 55 The common is-
sue in these private plaintiff cases which were held to have
demonstrated prima facie cases of a pattern or practice of dis-
44. Id. at 336 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14270 (1964)).




49. Id. at 338.
50. Id. at 342-43.
51. 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 247.
53. Id.
54. 529 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1976).
55. Id. at 729-30.
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crimination was statistical evidence, which showed the exclusion
of virtually all minorities or women. Discrimination was the em-
ployer's standard operating procedure, "the regular rather than
the unusual practice" of the employer.
56
EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc.,57 a recent case decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, held that
plaintiffs' demonstration that an employer acted out of "malice"
toward the protected group is not necessary to be successful in a
pattern or practice case. 58 However, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the employer deliberately discriminated because of the pro-
tected characteristic (i.e., because of race, sex or other traits).5 9
The Eleventh Circuit stated: "[I]f Joe's deliberately and systemati-
cally excluded women from food server positions based on a sexual
stereotype... it then could be found liable under Title VII for in-
tentional discrimination regardless of whether it also was moti-
vated by ill-will or malice toward women."60 Thus, a plaintiff must
only demonstrate that the employer discriminated due to the pro-
tected characteristic.
B. Phase II: The Remedial Phase
If a class of plaintiffs can prove that there is a pattern or
practice of discrimination, they enter the second phase of the trial
with a presumption in their favor that all employment decisions,
made while the discriminatory policy was in effect, were made in
furtherance of that policy.61 Once a court determines that there is
a pattern or practice of discrimination in the workplace, every
member of the class is entitled to relief, unless the employer can
demonstrate that its action toward an individual class member
was not related to its policy of discrimination. 62 This presumption
lessens the burden each class member must meet "relative to that
which would be required if the employee were [to proceed] sepa-
rately with an individual disparate treatment claim."63 This pre-
56. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
57. 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
58. Id. at 1283-84.
59. Id. at 1284.
60. Id.
61. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.
62. See id.
63. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 159 (2d
54520051
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sumption carried over to all of the members of the protected class
in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, not just those who had applied for the
line driver positions. 64 The defendants in Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
argued that unless a minority group employee actually applied for
a line driver job, he has not suffered any injury because of the
company's discriminatory policy as did those employees who had
actually applied for the positions. 65 The Supreme Court, however,
disagreed with the defendant's argument, and explained its rea-
soning:
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimina-
tion by a sign reading "Whites Only" on the hiring-office
door, his victims would not be limited to the few who
ignored the sign and subjected themselves to personal re-
buffs. ... When a person's desire for a job is not
translated into a formal application solely because of his
unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as much
a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through
the motions of submitting an application.66
This presumption in the employee's favor is rebuttable, how-
ever, and the employer is given the opportunity to present a de-
fense that it did not discriminate against that particular
plaintiff.67 Any justification offered by the employer is then subject
to rebuttal by the plaintiff that the conduct amounted to unlawful
discrimination.68
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw
A. Title VII
Since the Civil War and the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, America's margin-
alized citizens have endured countless struggles in all facets of life
Cir. 2001).
64. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365-66.
65. Id. at 363.
66. Id. at 365-66.
67. Id. at 362.
68. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05
(1973).
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to obtain equality.6 9 One such struggle has been the challenge of
bringing equality to the American workplace. As a landmark step
in attempting to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, Con-
gress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 Title VII
was enacted to prohibit employers from acting based on the status
or characteristics of an employee rather than on the employee's
ability or job performance. 71 Title VII makes it "an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."7
2
B. The Prima Facie Case: Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson
Not until 1986 did the Supreme Court recognize that sexual
harassment was included in the provision prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on sex in Title VII. In Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
7 3
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation
of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex created a
hostile or abusive work environment.7 4 The case involved a woman
who claimed that she had sex with her boss because she feared
losing her job if she did not comply with his demands.7 5 The plain-
tiffs boss asked for sexual favors, touched her in front of other
employees, and raped her.7 6 The Court set aside any doubt that
69. Examples of some such struggles are the civil and women's rights
movements.
70. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 261-62 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a) (2000)).
71. Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual Har-
assment Claims Under Title VII, 12 LAB. LAW. 291, 295 (1996).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). It is important to note, however,
that sex was not originally proposed as one of the protected classes under Ti-
tle VII until just before the bill passed in Congress. Blasi, supra note 71, at
297. The addition of the word "sex" to the bill was offered by Congressman
Howard W. Smith of Virginia to demonstrate the absurdity of Title VII as a
whole. Id. Smith hoped that tying the controversial 1960s issue of women's
rights to the bill would lead to the demise of the legislation. Id. While Smith's
attempt obviously backfired, it provides an explanation as to why there is
scarcely any legislative history regarding discrimination based on sex in Title
VII. Id. at 297-98.
73. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
74. Id. at 66.
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id.
20051
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sexual harassment was included in Title VII's prohibition of dis-
crimination based on sex, stating: "Without question, when a su-
pervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate [si' on the basis of
sex."77 The Court held that the plaintiffs allegations were "plainly
sufficient to state a claim for 'hostile environment' sexual harass-
ment."78 In holding as it did, the Court adopted the elements nec-
essary to prevail in a hostile work environmental claim. 79 In order
to assert a prima facie hostile work environment claim of sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that the employee belongs to a protected class; (2) that
the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual har-
assment, including sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that
the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (5) that the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior applies. 80
More simply put, for conduct to constitute actionable sexual
harassment, the conduct must be unwelcome and must "alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment."8' The test to determine if conduct was unwel-
come and amounts to actionable sexual harassment utilizes both
an objective and subjective approach: the conduct must be of such
a character that the plaintiff subjectively viewed the conduct as
abusive, and also such that a reasonable person would find that
the conduct created an abusive environment.8 2 In addition, the
77. Id. at 64.
78. Id. at 67.
79. Dianne Avery, Overview of the Law of Sexual Harassment and Re-
lated Claims, in LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 1, at 5.
80. Id. at 5. These elements were first established in Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Meritor Sav. Bank,
477 U.S. at 66-67 (adopting the Henson court's approach). These elements
have been reiterated by a number of federal courts analyzing sexual harass-
ment claims. See, e.g., Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp. 1323,
1326 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
81. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor
Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67).
82. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
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conduct must alter a term of the plaintiffs employment.83
1. Protected Class
To satisfy the first element of a prima facie claim for hostile
work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that he
or she is a member of the "protected class."84 In the context of sex-
ual harassment claims, the plaintiffs membership in a protected
class simply means that the plaintiff is either male or female.
8 5 All
that is required is a stipulation as to the plaintiffs gender to prove
he or she is a member of the protected class.8
6
2. Unwelcome Sexual Conduct
Next, in order for conduct (e.g., sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or verbal or physical conduct) to constitute sexual
harassment, it must be unwelcome. 87 Factors that establish that
certain conduct was unwelcome include the victim's outright rejec-
tion of sexual behavior or subsequent notification once a previ-
ously consensual sexual behavior is no longer welcome.88 This
unwelcome sexual conduct requirement makes the complainant's
conduct pertinent, "including the complainant's sexually provoca-
tive speech or dress, and [the complainant's] objective, as opposed
to subjective, reaction to the harassment."8 9 In a situation where
83. See id.; Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
84. Avery, supra note 79, at 5; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
85. The protected classes applicable in sexual harassment claims under
Title VII are the classes of "male" and "female." See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
But cf Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)
(holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII).
86. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; Barbara L. Zalucki, Discrimination Law:
Defining the Hostile Work Environment Claim of Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII, 11 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 143, 154 (1989).
87. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
88. FRANCIS ACHAMPONG, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW:
PRINCIPLES, LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE RISK
MANAGEMENT 41 (1999); see Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633 F. Supp.
1323, 1326-27, 1327 n.8 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff failed to
prove the second element of sexual harassment creating a hostile work envi-
ronment because she failed to report to any supervisors or coworkers regard-
ing once perceivably welcome conduct that later became unwelcome).
89. ACHAMPONG, supra note 88, at 41; see also Zalucki, supra note 86, at
157 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 903). Zalucki points out that "courts focus
on the behavior between the harasser and the victim to determine if it is 'un-
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sexual harassment plaintiffs have participated in sexually explicit
language and jokes, a hostile environment may be difficult to es-
tablish.90
3. Conduct Based on Sex
Third, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "but for" his or her
gender, he or she would not have been subject to sexual harass-
ment.91 In a situation where a work environment viewed in its to-
tality is "charged with sexual behavior not directed toward a
particular plaintiff or gender, a court may find that the harass-
ment was not based on sex."92 However, a plaintiff may still be
successful if he or she can demonstrate that the conduct "is dis-
proportionately more offensive or demeaning to one sex."93
4. Harassment that Affects a Term, Condition or Privilege of
Employment
Fourth, the Supreme Court has held that for sexual harass-
ment to be actionable, the conduct involved must be so "severe or
pervasive" that it alters "the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment and create[s] an abusive working environment."94 The Court
has "held that this not only covers 'terms' and 'conditions' in the
welcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit' the undesirable con-
duct." Id.
90. See, e.g., Loftin-Boggs, 633 F. Supp. at 1327 (holding that the plaintiff
had not shown that the alleged conduct was unwelcome where she admitted
during trial that she had participated in discussions about sex and used vul-
gar language in the workplace); Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair
Employment Practice Cases (BNA) 1315, 1319 (D.N.J. 1983) (noting that as
far as anyone working with the plaintiff could tell, she "appeared to accept[the allegedly harassing conduct] and joined in it as one of the boys and did
not complain to anyone"); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Employment
Practice Cases (BNA) 639, 640 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("Plaintiff was not subjected
to unprovoked propositions and sexually suggestive remarks, as she alleges.
Any such propositions that did occur were prompted by her own sexual ag-
gressiveness and her own sexually explicit conversations.").
91. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
92. ACHAMPONG, supra note 88, at 42.
93. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-23(M.D. Fla. 1991); see also ACHAMPONG, supra note 88, at 42.
94. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson,
682 F.2d at 904); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)(noting that "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders
offensive feelings in an employee" would not affect the conditions of employ-
ment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII).
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narrow contractual sense, but 'evinces a congressional intent to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women in employment."' 95 When a plaintiff's place of employment
"is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
sult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of a victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment,' Title VII is violated."96 However, the Court has also noted
that the conduct must be extreme to be viewed as affecting a term
or condition of employment.97 The Court has emphasized that
simple teasing or offhand remarks that are isolated incidents do
not meet the standard of affecting a term or condition of employ-
ment.98
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,99 the Supreme Court dis-
cussed factors that should be considered when determining
whether or not the conduct reached the severe or pervasive
threshold. 100 These "include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or hu-
miliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unrea-
sonably interferes with an employee's work performance." 10 1 A
plaintiff must also satisfy both an objective and subjective test in
order to prove that sexual harassment was "severe" or "perva-
sive."102 The Supreme Court held that for discriminatory harass-
ment to be viewed as "abusive work environment" harassment,
there must be: (1) an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
ment; as well as (2) a victim's subjective perception that the envi-
ronment is abusive: 10 3
95. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)
(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64).
96. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor
Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 67) (citations omitted).
97. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (stating that
the Court has made it "clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a
change in the terms and conditions of employment.").
98. Id. (emphasizing that occasional use of gender-related jokes and teas-
ing will not suffice to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment).
99. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 21-22; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
103. Id. (defining an objectively hostile or abusive work environment as an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and that
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Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the con-
ditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title
VII violation.1O4
Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct was sub-
jectively unwelcome, and that a reasonable person of that gender
would find that the environment was hostile and abusive.
5. Employer Liability
a. Harassment by a Supervisor: Vicarious Liability
The fifth prong of the sexual harassment test under Title VII
requires that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.O5 In
Meritor Sav. Bank, the Supreme Court did not define a clearly de-
lineated standard for determining when an employer should be li-
able for sexual harassment in the workplace regarding this
element of the claim.o6 The Court instead held that courts should
use common-law agency principles to resolve questions about em-
ployer liability. 107
In 1998, however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address the standard for determining employer liability for a su-
pervisor's "hostile environment" sexual harassment both in Bur-
lington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,08 and in Faragher v. City of Boca
the victim subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive).
104. Id.; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
105. See Avery, supra note 79, at 5. Respondeat superior is a "doctrine
holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful
acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 609 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
106. See 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) ("We... decline the parties' invitation to
issue a definitive rule on employer liability.").
107. Avery, supra note 79, at 12; see Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)) (citation omitted) (holding further that
"Congress's decision to define 'employer' [in Title VII] to include any 'agent' of
the employer, surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of em-
ployees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.").
108. See 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998).
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Raton.0 9 The Court held that when a supervisor with immediate
or successively higher authority over the victimized employee en-
gages in sexual harassment, an employer is vicariously liable to
the victimized employee for that supervisor's conduct. 110 In Bur-
lington Indus., Inc. and Faragher, the Court states the holding of
the cases using identical language which sets out the require-
ments for both the plaintiffs proof of vicarious liability and the de-
fendant employer's affirmative defense:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victim-
ized employee for an actionable hostile environment cre-
ated by a supervisor .... [A] defending employer may
raise an affirmative defense to liability .... The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.'
The liability/affirmative defense rule that the Court promul-
gated in Burlington Indus., Inc. and Faragher does not impose
"automatic" liability against employers in all types of cases involv-
ing harassment by a supervisor, but only in those cases that result
in a "tangible employment action."11 2 Similarly, with regard to the
affirmative defense sometimes available to employers, the Court
does not allow for "automatic" immunity, even when the employer
has a procedure to address grievances or where the employer did
not receive actual notice of the sexual harassment." 3 Proof that
109. See 524 U.S. 775, 775 (1998).
110. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
111. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
112. Avery, supra note 79, at 18; see also Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S.
at 765 (noting that "tangible employment actions[s]" include, for example,
"discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment"); Faragher, 524 U.S. at
808 (same).
113. Avery, supra note 79, at 18; see Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at
765 (noting that such policies must show that the employer used "reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior" and
must be "suitable to the employment circumstances," but also that "proof that
an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to
avoid harm" may usually be demonstrated by "showing an unreasonable fail-
ure [by the employee] to use any complaint procedure provided by the em-
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the plaintiff employee has failed to show a "tangible employment
action" is necessary to trigger the availability of an affirmative de-
fense to the defendant employer. 114 Indeed, the Court has made
clear that "in all sexual harassment cases involving conduct of su-
pervisors, the plaintiffs ability to prove evidence of a 'tangible
employment action' will be critical in both the characterization of
the plaintiffs substantive claim and the availability of an affirma-
tive defense to the defendant."15 The Court, in Burlington Indus.,
Inc., defines a tangible employment action as "a significant change
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a de-
cision causing a significant change in benefits." 16 Thus, if an em-
ployee establishes a prima facie case of sexual harassment by a
supervisor, including the presence of a "tangible employment ac-
tion," strict liability will attach and the plaintiff will prevail with-
out the defendant employer having gained the opportunity to
present an affirmative defense.117 On the other hand, "[i]f the
plaintiff has not suffered an adverse, tangible employment action
as a result of a supervisor's harassment, the employer is permitted
to raise an affirmative defense" by proving the elements annunci-
ated in Burlington Indus., Inc. to show that it should not be li-
able. 18 A failure to meet this burden will, of course, result in a
judgment for the plaintiff. 119
b. Harassment by a Coworker: Negligence Standard
When it is a coworker who allegedly commits sexual harass-
ment, courts rely on a negligence standard to determine whether
or not the employer is liable for its agent's actions. 20 In Burling-
ployer"); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (same).
114. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765 ("When no tangible employ-
ment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative de-
fense .... No affirmative defense is available... when the supervisor's
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action."); Faragher, 524
U.S. at 807 (same); see also Avery, supra note 79, at 18.
115. Avery, supra note 79, at 15; see also Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S.
at 760-61, 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
116. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 761.
117. See Avery, supra note 79, at 15.
118. Id. at 18; see Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765; see also
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
119. Avery, supra note 79, at 18.
120. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 758-59.
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ton Indus., Inc., the Court, noting that "[n]egligence sets a mini-
mal standard for employer liability under Title VII," 121 stated that
"[a]n employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it
knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop
it."122 Thus, rather than impose strict liability on employers for the
acts of all its employees, the strict standard discussed in the pre-
ceding section is applicable only to supervisors who harass their
subordinates. 23 Conversely, an employer is liable for sexual har-
assment by a regular coworker only if the employer had reason to
know of the employee's harassment of a fellow employee and the
employer did not act to prevent such harassment.
III. PATTERN OR PRACTICE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
In the context of a Title VII claim of discrimination based on
race, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters employed statistical evidence to show
that discriminatory hiring practices were the regular rather than
the unusual practice of the employer. 24 Several district courts
have held that a similar pattern or practice framework may be
utilized in sexual harassment cases brought under Title VII.'
25
What remains to be seen, however, is whether other district
courts, and eventually the appellate courts, will agree that sexual
harassment claims can be pursued under a pattern or practice
scheme.
A. Private Class Actions: Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.
The initial case that recognized pattern or practice theory as
an appropriate means to pursue sexual harassment claims was
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.126 The case was a private class ac-
tion, 127 and was certified under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
121. Id. at 759.
122. Id.
123. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.a.
124. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339
(1977).
125. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926, 945-47 (N.D. Ill.
2001); EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1070-
73 (C.D. Ill. 1998); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 875-76
(D. Minn. 1993).
126. 824 F. Supp. 847, 875 (D. Minn. 1993).
127. See id. at 855-56.
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Civil Procedure. 128 The named plaintiffs that represented the class
were three female employees of Eveleth.129 The plaintiffs claimed
that the company had a pattern or practice of discrimination
based on gender in hiring, job assignment, promotion, compensa-
tion, discipline and training.130 The plaintiffs also alleged a pat-
tern or practice theory of sexual discrimination in order to prove a
hostile work environment.' 3 ' The environment at Eveleth was
filled with references to sex and to women as sexual objects. 3 2
Pornographic graffiti, photos and cartoons permeated the work
environment at Eveleth. 33 In addition, there were many individ-
ual instances of harassment.34 For example, on one occasion a
male employee mimed performing oral sex on one of his female
coworkers in front of other men employed in the area while the
woman was sleeping on her break. 35 "Another woman returned to
her locker on three different occasions to find that someone had
broken into her locker and masturbated on her clothing." 36 In an
effort to determine whether the sexual harassment claim was a
violation of Title VII, the court examined the elements of a prima
facie sexual harassment case that were discussed in Meritor Sav.
Bank: (1) the plaintiffs in the case were all females and therefore
were members of a protected group; 37 (2) after examining the
plaintiffs' conduct, it was obvious that the harassment was unwel-
come because it was neither solicited nor invited and the plaintiffs
viewed the conduct as offensive; 38 (3) based on the great number
of instances directed at women and their sexual nature, the har-
assment was found to be based on sex;139 (4) the court held that a
128. Melissa Hart, Litigation Narratives: Why Jensen v. Ellerth Didn't
Change Sexual Harassment Law, But Still Has a Story Worth Telling, 18
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 282, 296-97 (2003) (book review). Rule 23 explains
the requirements for bringing class actions in federal court. See FED. R. CIv.
P. 23.
129. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 857.
130. Id. at 856.
131. Id. at 856, 879-88.
132. Id. at 879.
133. Id. at 879-80; see Hart, supra note 128, at 284-85.
134. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 880; Hart, supra note 128, at 284-85.
135. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 880.
136. Hart, supra note 128, at 285.
137. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 879.
138. Id. at 883.
139. Id. at 884.
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reasonable woman would find that the harassment and work envi-
ronment at Eveleth altered the terms and conditions of employ-
ment and was abusive; 4 0 and (5) the court found that the
plaintiffs had established the final requirement of respondeat su-
perior by demonstrating that the employer had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the alleged conduct.'4' Therefore, the court
found that the plaintiffs had "established that Eveleth Mines en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of maintaining an environment
sexually hostile to women."142 In regard to the damages resulting
to individual plaintiffs, the court reserved that subjective inquiry
to be determined in the remedial phase of the trial. 43 Thus, the
court found that the class of plaintiffs had established a prima fa-
cie case of sexual harassment by showing a pattern or practice of
abusive and hostile behavior.
The court arrived at its decision in the Jenson case by inte-
grating the law of a prima facie sexual harassment case with a
pattern or practice framework. At the time Jenson was decided, it
was the sole private class action to have attempted a claim under
such a framework. 44 The result was a new standard for sexual
harassment pattern or practice litigation. The court in Jenson di-
vided the trial into two phases: 45 in phase I, the question was
whether the employer was liable; 146 phase II was the remedial
phase of the trial.147
A finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation
of Title VII in the first instance ordinarily entitles each member of
a class to a presumption that she was individually discriminated
against by the defendant. 48 "Then in the recovery phase the bur-
140. Id. at 886.
141. Id. at 888.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Marcy O'Brien, Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.: A Legal
Standard for Class Action Sexual Harassment, 19 J. CORP. L. 417, 425 (1994).
144. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 875 ("By maintaining their sexual harass-
ment claims as a class action, Plaintiffs seek to expand sexual harassment
discrimination to a new arena; to the Court's knowledge, no class of plaintiffs
has ever maintained through trial a claim of sexual harassment.").
145. Id. at 856.
146. Id. (stating that the first phase determines whether defendant has
violated Title VII).
147. Id. (stating that the second phase determines whether individual
plaintiffs are entitled to relief).
148. O'Brien, supra note 143, at 425-26; see Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 860
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den shifts to the defendant employer to prove a particular class
member was not discriminated against by this pattern or prac-
tice."149 However, in Jenson the court took a different approach
than previous pattern or practice cases. The Jenson court held
that an individual plaintiff in a sexual harassment class action is
not entitled to a presumption that he or she was sexually harassed
once the court determines that the employer engaged in a pattern
or practice of discrimination, and therefore, the burden does not
automatically shift to the defendant after a pattern or practice of
sexual discrimination has been proven. 150 "Instead, the burden of
persuasion remains on the individual class members; each must
show ... that she was as affected as the reasonable woman."' 5 '
Thus, the Jenson court refused to apply the normal presump-
tion that all members of a protected class are entitled to relief in a
pattern or practice sexual harassment class action. The different
standard applied in Jenson required two further inquiries once it
was determined by the court that the employer was liable to the
class of plaintiffs: "1) whether any individual plaintiff could satisfy
the further requirement that she found the challenged conduct
unwelcome; and 2) whether any individual plaintiff was entitled to
damages flowing from the violation." 15 2 These requirements were
applied in Jenson to mean that once a pattern or practice is estab-
lished, each individual class member seeking relief must demon-
strate "by a preponderance of the evidence that she was as
affected as the reasonable woman."153 In defining this new stan-
dard for pattern or practice sexual harassment class actions, the
Jenson court reasoned that because an individual sexual harass-
ment plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that he or she
was subjectively affected, and "[b]ecause the [individual] em-
ployee's subjective response to acts of sexual harassment is an es-
sential part of proving a claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment," demonstrating a pattern or practice of sexual har-
assment in the liability phase of the trial does not satisfy this re-
quirement for each individual claimant in a class action "hostile
n.18.
149. O'Brien, supra note 143, at 426; see Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 860 n.18.
150. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
151. Id.
152. See Hart, supra note 128, at 294.
153. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
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environment" claim. 54
B. EEOC Pattern and Practice Sexual Harassment Litigation
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
similarly utilized pattern or practice theory in pursuing hostile
environment sexual harassment claims. The EEOC was created in
1964 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to enforce the antidis-
crimination provisions of the Act.155 One of the powers granted to
the EEOC under Title VII is the power "to intervene in [a] civil ac-
tion upon certification that the case is of general importance." 56
The EEOC must satisfy certain statutory prerequisites before it
can bring a Title VII action in federal court.157 However, the
EEOC is allowed to proceed with a pattern or practice claim with-
out meeting the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 158 even though pattern or practice cases share
most of the characteristics of class litigation. This enables the
EEOC to bring a pattern or practice case with greater ease than a
private class of plaintiffs, and provides the EEOC with certain ad-
vantages in pursuing pattern or practice claims. 159 Two cases in
particular, EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc.,160 and
EEOC v. Dial Corp.,161 are discussed below to demonstrate how
154. Id. (emphasis omitted).
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(a), (g)(6) (Supp. 2004).
156. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
157. CHARLES S. MISHKIND & V. Sco2rr KNEESE, Big Risks and Opportuni-
ties, Class Actions and Pattern and Practice Cases, in 1 30TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 403, 434 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. H-662 2001) ("The necessary administrative
process includes (1) a charge (usually an EEOC Commissioner's charge); (2)
notice of the charge; (3) investigation; (4) a reasonable cause decision; and (5)
attempted conciliation. The EEOC cannot skip any of these steps or conduct
any of its administrative proceedings out of the prescribed statutory se-
quence.").
158. Id. ("[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23 requirements do not apply
where the EEOC seeks to enforce Title VII by intervening rather than by
bringing a direct action.").
159. For example, "[aill class members need not satisfy administrative
prerequisites when the EEOC brings an action on behalf of a class. For in-
stance, in an EEOC action under Title VII, those who were discriminated
against beyond the 300-day EEOC filing period could become class members
if one of them alleged a violation within the 300-day period." Id.
160. 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
161. 156 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
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the EEOC has pursued sexual harassment claims utilizing a pat-
tern or practice theory.
1. EEOC v. Mitsubishi
In EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., the issue was
whether, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the EEOC could
bring a pattern or practice sexual harassment claim on behalf of
plaintiffs seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 162 The case
dealt with sexual harassment at a single Mitsubishi automobile
assembly plant. 6 3 The EEOC identified 289 victims of sexual har-
assment out of the approximately 1200 women who worked at the
plant since the facility opened. 64 The EEOC claimed that the
company had a "pattern or practice" of sexual harassment because
it "created and maintained a sexually hostile and abusive work
environment at [one of its plants] because it tolerated, from the
facility's inception, individual acts of sexual harassment by its
employees by refusing to take notice of, investigate, and/or disci-
pline the workers who sexually harassed other employees." 165 Mit-
subishi argued that because the essence of proving a sexual
harassment claim is to show that the conduct was subjectively
unwelcome, there were too many individual issues in a sexual
harassment claim for a pattern or practice theory of liability to be
an appropriate framework for pursuing such claims. 66 Mitsubishi
thus opposed the EEOC's use of a pattern or practice theory.
The district court disagreed with Mitsubishi, holding that the
requirement that a plaintiff prove subjective harassment on an
individualized basis does not preclude pattern or practice litiga-
tion of sexual harassment claims by the EEOC.167 Instead, the
court held that a pattern or practice case can be established with-
out the subjective proof of each individual plaintiff. 68 Because
pattern or practice cases "target large scale, system-wide dis-
criminatory practices and their effects," 69 and because the EEOC
162. 990 F. Supp. at 1069.
163. Id.
164. Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
165. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1069.
166. Id.; see also Delikat, supra note 6, at 59.




in a pattern or practice case acts for the benefit of both the specific
harassed individuals and "'to vindicate the public interest in pre-
venting employment discrimination,"' 170 the court held that the
Meritor Sav. Bank requirement of subjective proof is not applica-
ble to a pattern or practice case of sexual harassment. 171 There-
fore, once pattern or practice liability for sexual harassment is
established, a rebuttable presumption of liability arises as to each
individual victim, shifting the burden of production to the em-
ployer on subjective elements of individual claims. 172
The court also described how to establish a pattern or practice
in order to trigger this presumption of liability. The court relied
heavily on Jenson and held that a finding of severe and pervasive
sexual harassment is proper if, "based on the sum of the individ-
ual testimony by the class, the trier of fact determines that an ob-
jectively reasonable person would have to spend the work day
running a 'gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living."'173 To be deemed a pat-
tern or practice, harassing behavior must occur: (1) "frequently
enough that it is both common and continuous" so that the "com-
pany can reasonably be said to be on 'notice' of. .. [the] sexual
harassment that constitutes a hostile environment. . . .";174 (2)
when there is "evidence that many of a company's first-line super-
visors had actual knowledge of the harassing behaviors" and thus
the company can reasonably be said to have been put on notice of
the behavior; 175 or (3) when an employer is negligent in that it
"has a policy or practice of tolerating a work environment that it
knows or should have known is permeated with sexual harass-
ment, but does not take steps to address the problem on a com-
pany-wide basis."176
In addition, the Mitsubishi court laid out the framework for a
sexual harassment pattern or practice case:
170. Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 326 (1980) (citation omitted)).
171. Id. at 1076; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64-67 (adopting the approach of Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-
05 (11th Cir. 1982)).
172. Id. at 1076-77; see also Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
173. Id. at 1074 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1074-75.
176. Id. at 1075.
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In Phase I, [the pattern or practice phase,] the EEOC will
be permitted to establish a pattern or practice [of sexual
harassment] by proving an objectively reasonable person
would find (1) a pattern or practice of sexual harassment
defined as a situation where individuals in the workplace,
as a whole, must accept a gender hostile environment and
(2) a company policy of tolerating a workforce permeated
with severe and pervasive sexual harassment. 177
As the court further explained, "the landscape of the total
work environment, rather than the subjective experiences of each
individual claimant, is the focus for establishing a pattern or prac-
tice of unwelcome sexual harassment which is severe and perva-
sive."178 Thus, the Mitsubishi court agreed with the Jenson court
that subjective "unwelcomeness" of the individual class members
is not relevant in phase I (the pattern or practice phase).179 How-
ever, the Mitsubishi court disagreed with the Jenson court as to
whether a rebuttable presumption of liability arises in phase II for
all individual class members once a pattern or practice is estab-
lished in phase 1.180 Instead of holding that a presumption does
not arise as the Jenson court did,181 the Mitsubishi court held that
in phase II (the relief phase), once pattern or practice liability for
sexual harassment is established, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant employer to try to prove that individual members of the class
did not subjectively perceive the work environment to be hostile. 8 2
After the defendant brings its defenses against individual mem-
bers of the class, the members of the class who are challenged by
the employer possess the ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that they were subjectively affected by the hostile work en-
vironment. 8 3 "For those individuals not challenged, the presump-
tion turns into a liability finding and the [clourt can then move to
177. Delikat, supra note 6, at 59-60; see Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990
F. Supp. at 1073.
178. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1074 (citations omit-
ted); Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
179. See Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1077; see also
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 876 (D. Minn. 1993).
180. See Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1078; see also
Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
181. See Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
182. See id. at 1077; Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
183. Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
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the individual damages phase."184
As previously noted, this approach is distinguishable from the
framework laid out in Jenson.185 The Mitsubishi court, unlike
Jenson,8 6 gave individual plaintiffs alleging "hostile work envi-
ronment" sexual harassment the advantage of a rebuttable pre-
sumption once a pattern or practice of harassing conduct is
established. 8 7 The burden of production is then shifted in the sec-
ond phase of the trial to the employer defendant. 188 As the Mitsu-
bishi court seemed to suggest, this burden on the employer may be
difficult to meet.189 Therefore, the Mitsubishi standard appears to
be more favorable to individual plaintiffs than that outlined in
Jenson.190
2. EEOC v. Dial Corp.
In EEOC v. Dial Corp.,191 the EEOC brought a pattern or
practice sexual harassment claim on behalf of 100 plaintiffs. 192
Sexual harassment of women was prevalent at the Dial Manufac-
turing plant:193
Female employees were continuously propositioned and
assaulted and grabbed by virtually every part of their
bodies, including their breasts, buttocks, and genitals....
Pornography was openly circulated and posted in the
plant. Penises carved from soap were displayed. Men
184. Id.; see also Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1077.
185. Compare Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1077, with
Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
186. See Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
187. See Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1077.
188. Id. at 1077-78; see also Maureen S. Binetti et al., MultiplaintiffLiti-
gation and Class Actions: Plaintiffs' Perspective, in LMGATING THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 1, at 139, 151.
189. See Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1077; see also Bi-
netti et al., supra note 188, at 151.
190. See Binetti et al., supra note 188, at 151 ("The [Mitsubishi Motor Mfg.
of Am.] court noted that once a pattern or practice of sexual harassment is
established in phase one, the likelihood is great that a class member would be
able to prove the subjective element of his or her claim in phase two.").
191. 156 F.Supp.2d 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
192. Plaintiff EEOC's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Dial's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d
926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (No. 99C3356) (on file with author).
193. Id. at 1.
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stalked women inside the plant, in the employee parking
lot, and by automobile driving home from work. 194
As in Mitsubishi,195 the Dial defendant argued
that the pattern or practice theory of liability was never
viable in sexual harassment cases because such claims
were inherently individualized and because it had no
identifiable policy in favor of harassment which adversely
affected a class of readily identifiable victims; hence the
EEOC was not challenging a policy or practice of general
application but was simply attempting to aggregate a
large number of highly individualized claims which were
not susceptible to class-type treatment. 96
Like the court in Mitsubishi, 97 the Dial court denied Dial's
motion for summary judgment and held that pattern or practice
liability depended on the "'landscape of the total work environ-
ment, rather than the subjective experiences of each individual
claimant.'"'1g The court concluded that the basis for establishing
pattern or practice liability was Dial's policy of tolerating sexual
harassment and not the gathering of individual sexual harass-
ment claims. 99
IV. WHY A PATTERN OR PRACTICE THEORY OF LIABILITY IS NOT
AN APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR PURSUING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS
As discussed earlier,200 while some federal trial courts have
extended a pattern or practice theory of liability to sexual har-
assment claims, to date no appellate court has accepted this appli-
cation of a pattern or practice theory. Extension of the theory to
all Title VII sexual harassment hostile work environment cases
raises serious questions regarding: (1) the ability of private plain-
194. Id.
195. See EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059,
1069 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
196. Delikat, supra note 6, at 61; see also EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F.
Supp. 2d 926, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
197. See Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1076.
198. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of
Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1074).
199. Id. at 946.
200. See discussion supra Introduction.
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tiffs to meet Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2)
whether it is appropriate to treat sexual harassment claims as
class actions considering the distinct individuality of sexual har-
assment claims where a plaintiff must prove that there was an ob-
jectively hostile work environment, and that he or she was
subjectively affected by the sexual harassment; and (3) if sexual
harassment claims are appropriate for class treatment, how the
courts should handle the burden shift in the remedial phase of the
trial.201
A. Tensions Involved in Meeting Rule 23 for Private Class Actions
The first concern with the extension of pattern or practice
theory to all Title VII sexual harassment hostile work environ-
ment cases is related to class certification under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In private class actions, a class
201. There are a number of other issues that may present problems with
pursuing claims of sexual harassment under a pattern or practice framework;
however, they are beyond the scope of this Comment. Among them is whether
all of the plaintiffs in the class can comply with the statute of limitations, and
whether the application of the theory in such situations is being used merely
to bootstrap time-barred claims. Victims of harassment have a 300-day limi-
tations period to bring a claim under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
(2000). However, some courts permit plaintiffs to attempt to bring claims that
may otherwise not meet the statute of limitations by relying upon the con-
tinuing violation doctrine. See, e.g., Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 936 (9th
Cir. 1999) (describing the "continuing violation doctrine" as a doctrine allow-
ing courts to consider conduct that would ordinarily be time-barred "as long
as the untimely incidents represent an ongoing unlawful employment prac-
tice").
In addition, the bifurcating of proceedings in sexual harassment class
actions may potentially cause Seventh Amendment violations. See Robert M.
Brava-Partain, Due Process, Rule 23, and Hybrid Class Actions: A Practical
Solution, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1376 (2002). The Seventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the rightof trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexaminedin any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. A violation of the Seventh Amendment "can occur
when different juries are asked to decide the same issue or when a subse-
quent jury is asked to reexamine issues decided by the previous jury, thus
violating the so-called reexamination clause." Brava-Partain, supra, at 1376.
To the extent that a remedial phase jury must reexamine the factual findings
of a liability phase jury, this violates the Seventh Amendment right to have a
single jury pass on a common issue of fact. See id.
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of plaintiffs may have a difficult time meeting the requirements of
Rule 23. Currently, there is a split among the circuit courts as to
whether a class of plaintiffs seeking monetary relief can be certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2),202 and it is much more difficult to certify
a class under Rule 23(b)(3).203 To bring a class action in federal
court, a class of plaintiffs must be certified according to the re-
quirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.204
Under Rule 23(a), the class must meet four prerequisites in order
to be certified:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all class
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 20
In addition to these prerequisites, the class must fit into one
of the categories in Rule 23(b).206 Courts generally will categorize
a class of plaintiffs in an employment discrimination case under
either Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3).207 Rule 23(b)(2) states that it is
appropriate to certify a class when a defendant "has acted or re-
fused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding de-
claratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." 208 Rule
202. See Delikat, supra note 6, at 55; Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. 151
F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998).
203. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
204. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23(f) is a recent amendment to Rule 23
that allows immediate appeal of district court rulings certifying or denying a
class. FED. R. CIv P. 23(f); see also Binetti et al., supra note 188, at 146. Both
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys have applauded the rule. Plaintiffs' law-
yers like the rule because "rather than being forced to await the outcome of
litigation, plaintiffs will seek to immediately appeal the denial of certifica-
tion, thus preserving the hope that a classwide settlement or verdict may be
obtained." Binetti et al., supra note 188, at 146. Defense lawyers like "the
new rule because it provides them with an avenue by which to immediately
challenge class certification and thus delay the almost inevitable road to class
settlement discussions." Id.
205. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Binetti et al., supra note 188, at 142.
206. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
207. Hart, supra note 128, at 296.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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23(b)(3) provides a provision for classes that do not fit neatly into
the other categories in Rule 23(b):209 certification is appropriate
under Rule 23(b)(3) after a court has determined "that the ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predomi-
nate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."210
The plaintiffs in Jenson were certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 211
At the time Jenson was certified, it was the general practice of
courts to certify a class of plaintiffs claiming employment dis-
crimination under Rule 23(b)(2).212 This was because employment
discrimination cases often involved a situation where the em-
ployer has "acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class."213 Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which allowed class members to seek compensatory and pu-
nitive damages,21 4 courts have been skeptical about certifying em-
ployment classes seeking these remedies under Rule 23(b)(2). 21 5
Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Title VII class actions focused
almost exclusively on obtaining some form of equitable relief,
"such as back pay, reinstatement, or modification of discrimina-
tory policies or practices, because equitable relief was the only re-
lief available."216 In Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown,217 the Supreme
Court stated that there is "at least a substantial possibility" that
"in actions seeking monetary damages, classes can be certified
only under Rule 23(b)(3)." 218 This is because "class members' con-
stitutional due process rights must be protected by allowing them
to opt out of the class and pursue their individual damages
claims."219 However, the Supreme Court's opinion only denied the
209. Hart, supra note 128, at 296.
210. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
211. Hart, supra note 128, at 297.
212. Id.
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
214. Hart, supra note 128, at 297.
215. See id. at 296-98.
216. Katherine H. Parker, Emerging Standards for Certification of Title
VII Pattern or Practice Class Claims and Other Changes to Rule 23 Practice
5 (May 2, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
217. 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
218. Id. at 121; see also Hart, supra note 128, at 297.
219. See Hart, supra note 128, at 297; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999).
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grant of a writ of certiorari; 220 therefore, it did not create a rule of
law for lower courts to apply.
Courts have since been split as to whether a class of plaintiffs
seeking individual monetary relief can be certified under Rule
23(b)(2).221 In Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,222 for example, the
Fifth Circuit held that this inclusion of individual claims for com-
pensatory and punitive damages made certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) inappropriate, "because individual
claims predominated over class claims and rendered class treat-
ment unwieldy and unworkable.223 The court in Allison indicated
that the purpose of a class action is to preserve the resources of
the courts and the parties.224 The court believed that classes of
plaintiffs that are seeking substantial monetary remedies will
more likely consist of members with divergent interests that
overwhelm claims common to the class.225 A few other circuit
courts have followed this same logic in refusing to permit class
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) where substantial monetary or
punitive damages were sought. 226
However, in Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Co. ,227 the Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
Allison.228 Unlike the Allison court, the Robinson court held that
"the changes made by the 1991 [Civil Rights] Act are not fatal to
220. See Ticor Title Ins. Co., 511 U.S. at 117.
221. See Hart, supra note 128, at 297.
222. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
223. Parker, supra note 216, at 2.
224. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 409.
225. Parker, supra note 216, at 10 (citing Allison, 151 F.3d at 413).
226. For another example of a circuit court that followed logic similar to
the Allison court's analysis in refusing to permit class certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) for a Title VII claim, see Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195
F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999), where the Seventh Circuit approved the Fifth Cir-
cuit's analysis of predominance and vacated class certification of a Title VII
claim under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 898. Similarly, in Murray v. Auslander, 244
F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit also approved of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's incidental damages test and adopted it in holding that the plaintiff
class's damages claim predominated over its claims for equitable relief, and
thus the district court had abused its discretion when it failed to exempt the
damages claims from class treatment under Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 812. In
Coleman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 296 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002),
the Sixth Circuit expressed similar logic. Id. at 448; see also Changelo, supra
note 13, at 138.
227. 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001).
228. Id. at 164.
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class treatment of employment discrimination claims." 229
[T]he Second Circuit stated that district courts should use
an 'ad hoc' test to determine the appropriateness of class
certification. Under this test, the District Court must 'as-
sess whether (b)(2) certification is appropriate in light of
the relative importance of the remedies sought' and may
allow certification under Rule 23(b)(2) if it finds in its 'in-
formed, sound judicial discretion' that (1) 'the positive
weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or de-
claratory relief sought is predominant even though com-
pensatory or punitive damages are also claimed,' and (2)
class treatment would be efficient and manageable,
thereby achieving an appreciable measure of judicial
economy.230
The court in Robinson recognized that a claim for monetary
damages that are not incidental under Rule 23(b)(2) may pose a
due process risk because it does not allow procedural protections,
such as notice or the option to withdraw from the class. 231 How-
ever, the court noted that these due process risks could be ad-
dressed by a district court allowing notice and opt-out rights to
absent class members. 232 Therefore, with the present split in the
circuit courts as to whether a class of plaintiffs seeking monetary
relief can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), 233 it is unclear at this
juncture whether courts will allow certification of a class of plain-
tiffs seeking primarily monetary damages in a sexual harassment
case under Rule 23(b)(2), or require a class of plaintiffs to meet the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) is much more diffi-
cult "because of [the] additional requirements that common issues
predominate over individual ones and that a class action be the
superior method for resolving claims."234 Issues regularly posed
that are common to all members of the classes in sexual harass-
ment class action suits focus on "whether the work environment
229. Id. at 157.
230. Parker, supra note 216, at 19 (quoting Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164).
231. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 166.
232. Id.
233. See Hart, supra note 128, at 297.
234. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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was objectively hostile and whether the employer's policy for ad-
dressing harassment was inadequate."235 On the other hand, indi-
vidual plaintiffs' issues in a sexual harassment suit usually
include "whether each woman [or man] found the work environ-
ment subjectively unwelcome; whether the standards for employer
liability for the conduct have been met as to each plaintiff; and
what damages each particular plaintiff may be entitled to re-
ceive." 236 With issues weighing so equally on both sides of the Rule
23(b)(3) balance, it is likely to be difficult to discern whether it is
the class issues or the individual plaintiffs' issues that predomi-
nate in a particular case. It is unclear how courts will decide
whether or not the common issues predominate over the individ-
ual questions as required for certification under Rule 23(b)(3),237
but the fact that courts must do this balancing test at all substan-
tially lessens the possibility that a class will be certified. Thus, it
is ironic that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was meant to
strengthen Title VII law by allowing greater damage awards and
jury trials,238 may have diminished the likelihood of successful
class certification.
B. Distinct Individuality of Sexual Harassment Claims and Proof
Problems
Another problem with extending pattern or practice theory to
all Title VII sexual harassment hostile work environment cases is
that the issues raised in sexual harassment suits are often in-
tensely personal and individualized in nature. Sexual harassment
claims should not be litigated using a pattern or practice frame-
work because of the distinct individuality of such claims as com-
pared to other types of Title VII claims. In most types of pattern or
practice litigation, plaintiffs rely on statistical data to establish an
inference of intentional discrimination by their employer: "In or-
der to establish such an inference, plaintiffs must present statisti-
cal evidence demonstrating that there is a 'long lasting' and 'gross'
disparity in the representation of members of the class from what
would be expected from employment decisions made without re-
235. Hart, supra note 128, at 297.
236. Id. at 298.
237. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
238. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III 1991)).
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gard to the class members' protected status."239 Plaintiffs may
prove a pattern or practice of employment discrimination by dem-
onstrating, through statistical evidence of hirings, promotions or
other employment benefits, that a certain protected group was in-
tentionally discriminated against; a fact that will be evident
where there is a gross disparity in the statistical evidence con-
trasting benefits denied to the protected group versus all employ-
ees.
The inherent individuality of sexual harassment claims also
presents a problem for those individual sexual harassment plain-
tiffs compelled by courts to not only prove a pattern or practice of
harassment, but also that they were subjectively affected by such
conduct. In traditional pattern or practice cases, it does not matter
what a plaintiffs subjective feelings were about the intentional
discrimination; all that matters for phase I liability is that the
plaintiff was in the protected group.240 A presumption arises after
the first phase of traditional pattern or practice claims that each
individual plaintiff was discriminated against and is entitled to
damages. 241 For example, "in a case challenging a failure to pro-
mote, it does not matter what the employee's reaction was to not
being promoted. All that is relevant is whether the employer was
motivated by discriminatory animus in making the employment
decision."242 This example describes the circumstances in Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, as well as in most other Title VII pattern or
practice claims.24 3
However, other courts have held that this presumption does
not automatically arise with a showing of pattern or practice, and
the individual plaintiffs in a sexual harassment class action also
must prove that they were subjectively affected by the pattern or
239. Fred W. Alvarez et al., Class Actions and Pattern and Practice
Claims: Overview of Theories, Defenses, Settlements and the Government's Ac-
tivist Role, in 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 280, 303-04 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-591 1998) (citing
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977), as utiliz-
ing statistical evidence presented by the class of plaintiffs)).
240. See discussion supra Part III.B; see also EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor
Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1077 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
241. See discussion supra Part III.B.
242. Hart, supra note 128, at 293 (citations omitted).
243. See 431 U.S. 329, 362 (1977).
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practice of harassment to prevail. 244 In a sexual harassment pat-
tern or practice context, plaintiffs often do not have proof that
harassment occurred in their workplace. This is due to the often
private and secretive nature of such harassment. Moreover, sub-
jective feelings are more difficult to prove than objective facts.
Thus, an individual plaintiff often must prove not only that there
was an objectively hostile work environment affecting the class,
but also that he or she was subjectively affected by the sexual
harassment, with little real evidence to rely upon.245 This aspect of
sexual harassment pattern or practice claims distinguishes them
from other types of Title VII pattern or practice claims. Plaintiffs
attempting to demonstrate a pattern or practice of sexual harass-
ment usually do not rely on statistical data, but instead must
prove allegations of established events, which makes liability
much more difficult to prove. Therefore, a plaintiff in a sexual
harassment suit will likely have problems proving the subjective
and individualized elements of a prima facie case, such as demon-
strating that he or she "was subjected to objectively offensive con-
duct because of gender, which was unwelcome and so severe and
pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment."246
1. Conduct that was Severe or Pervasive as to Alter the Conditions
of Employment
When a fact-finder determines whether a plaintiff has met the
"severe and pervasive" prong of the sexual harassment claim, he
or she must look at all of the circumstances. These include the
"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-
ance; and whether it reasonably interferes with an employee's
244. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 876 (1993)("[A] determination that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of dis-
crimination by maintaining a hostile environment does not entitle every
member of the plaintiff class to a presumption that they were sexually har-
assed - the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer.").
245. See id. (holding that sexual harassment claimants must provide evi-
dence of both an objective pattern of harassment and subjective effects of the
alleged hostile work environment on individual plaintiffs in order to prevail).
But see Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., 990 F. Supp. at 1076 (holding that an
individual plaintiff need not show that he or she was subjectively affected by
a hostile work environment to prevail).
246. Willner et al., supra note 1, at 159.
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work performance."247 The answers to these questions depend on
each employee's individual experience and therefore must be re-
solved on an individual basis. In traditional pattern or practice
cases, such as Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,248 there may be dueling over
the statistical data and what it means, but there is at least data of
established events. Sexual harassment cases, on the other hand,
are merely allegations that need to be proved by examining the
individual issues as to each individual's work environment and
experience.
2. Unwelcomeness
Similarly, sexual harassment claims are distinguishable from
other types of Title VII pattern or practice claims because of the
subjective "unwelcomeness" that the plaintiff must prove in a sex-
ual harassment claim. Courts refer to sexual harassment as "very
individual and varied,"249 and "they often focus on the plaintiffs
burden to prove that the challenged workplace conduct was 'un-
welcome."' 250 This is distinguishable from most Title VII pattern or
practice claims because most claims focus on the behavior of the
employer. In most Title VII claims, a plaintiff must demonstrate
only that the employer discriminated based on the protected char-
acteristic. By contrast, in sexual harassment cases, even though
conduct may be objectively unreasonable a plaintiff will not be
successful unless he or she can prove that the conduct was subjec-
tively unwelcome. 251 For instance, if an individual has participated
in sexually explicit language and jokes, subjective "unwelcome-
ness" may be difficult to establish.25 2 Therefore, sexual harass-
247. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
248. See 431 U.S. at 362.
249. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agric. Implement Workers
of Am. v. LTV Aerospace and Def. Co., 136 F.R.D. 113, 130 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(declining to certify a class of plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment because
the court concluded that the sexual harassment claims were "too individual-
ized" and "not amenable" to class treatment).
250. Hart, supra note 128, at 293.
251. See Avery, supra note 79, at 5; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (adopting the elements of sexual harass-
ment claims from Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir.
1982)).
252. See supra note 90.
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ment cases do not lend themselves to a pattern or practice frame-
work as neatly as other types of Title VII claims because the issue
as to whether the conduct was unwelcome may vary from em-
ployee to employee. It may thus be difficult (or perhaps even im-
possible in some instances) to show that the entire pattern of
harassment was unwelcome to the entire class of plaintiffs. This
individualized issue makes it difficult to assert sexual harassment
claims under a pattern or practice framework.
3. Employer Liability
Another individualized issue arising specifically in sexual
harassment claims as opposed to other forms of Title VII litigation
concerns the fifth factor enunciated in Meritor Sav. Bank: whether
an employer should be liable for sexual harassment in the work-
place. 253 The standards used to determine whether the employer is
liable for the conduct of the employee are different depending on
who the party guilty of sexually harassing the plaintiff happens to
be. If the harassment is by a supervisor, there is a vicarious liabil-
ity standard.254 If the harassment is by a coworker, the standard is
one of ordinary negligence. 255 It is possible that, within a given
class of plaintiffs, the standard of employer liability may vary
from employee to employee depending on who was the perpetrator
of the harassing conduct as to each individual plaintiff. Due to
these individual issues that must be proven in sexual harassment
claims, such claims do not lend themselves to a pattern or practice
framework as easily as do other Title VII pattern or practice
claims that rely principally on statistical evidence to establish li-
ability.
4. Affirmative Defense
Another issue that presents problems with utilizing pattern
or practice treatment is the fact-based affirmative defense that the
Supreme Court established in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton256
and Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc.257 The Supreme Court held
253. See Avery, supra note 79, at 5; see also Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at
66-67 (1986).
254. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.a.
255. See discussion supra Part II.B.5.b.
256. See 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
257. See 524 U.S. 742 (1998); see also discussion supra Part II.B.5.a.
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that as long as the harassment did not cause a tangible employ-
ment action, "[t]he defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plain-
tiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any pre-
ventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise." 258 While a pattern or practice sexual har-
assment claim may be an appropriate avenue for determining
whether an employer maintained adequate anti-harassment poli-
cies and procedures, it is not an appropriate means to determine if
each employee was subject to a tangible employment action, or
whether each employee unreasonably failed to report the alleged
harassment. This is another issue which must be resolved case by
case, plaintiff by plaintiff, making the pattern or practice frame-
work inappropriate for sexual harassment claims for yet another
reason.
C. Problems Involving the Burden Shift in the Remedial Phase
A third concern with the extension of pattern or practice the-
ory to all Title VII sexual harassment hostile work environment
cases lies with the presumption that arises after phase I liability
is shown, shifting the burden of persuasion as to the lack of sub-
jective feelings by individual plaintiffs to the employer. This pre-
sumption and burden shift is likely to lead to unfairness to the
defendant employer in such cases. However, having no burden
shift does not necessarily solve the problem. Without allowing the
burden to shift to the defendant once a pattern or practice of har-
assment has been demonstrated, any utility that the pattern or
practice framework may have had regarding sexual harassment
claims may be lost. This further emphasizes the inappropriateness
of a pattern or practice framework in the contest of Title VII sex-
ual harassment claims.
In Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., the court held that once
phase I liability is established by showing a pattern or practice of
harassment, the burden of production shifts to the employer. 259 At
that point, the employer has the ability to bring evidence showing
that individual members of the class of plaintiffs did not subjec-
258. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
259. 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1077 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
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tively perceive the environment as a sexually hostile environ-
ment.260 After the defendant brings its defenses against individual
members of the class, the members of the class who are challenged
by the employer possess the ultimate burden of proving to the
trier of fact that they were subjectively affected by the harass-
ment. For those individual plaintiffs that the defendant does not
challenge, the presumption turns into a finding of liability and the
court moves to the individual damages phase. 261 This procedure is
inherently unfair to the employer because, by the conclusion of the
phase I liability portion of the case, the employer has been found
liable to the class despite the absence of proof of the essential ele-
ment of subjective harm that a plaintiff would have to prove in an
individual sexual harassment case. 262 The Mitsubishi and Dial
courts attempted to make the cases resemble a traditional pattern
or practice case in terms of burden shifting;263 however, in doing so
the courts shifted the burden of production of one of the essential
elements of the sexual harassment claim. Defendant employers
appear to be required to prove an element of sexual harassment
that was indicated initially as part of the plaintiffs prima facie
case in Meritor Sav. Bank.26 4 This is patently unfair because it
forces the defendant to bring forth evidence that an individual
plaintiff was not subjectively harmed by the pattern of sexual
harassment that has already been proven. This relieves a plaintiff
from proving an essential element of its case and places the bur-
260. See id.; see also Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
261. Delikat, supra note 6, at 60.
262. As noted previously, a plaintiff in an individual sexual harassment
case would have to prove that he or she was subjectively affected by the har-
assment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986)
(adopting the elements of sexual harassment claims from Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Avery, supra note 79,
at 5. Even the Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am. court realized the double stan-
dard this creates. The court acknowledged the inappropriateness of the pre-
sumption and burden shift for the second phase of the trial where individual
plaintiffs would have to prove that they are entitled to individual monetary
damages, 990 F. Supp. at 1077, but kept the presumption and burden shift
for proving a wide-spread pattern or practice of harassment with a request
only for injunctive relief as to the hostile work environment in general. See
id. at 1077.
263. See discussion supra Part III.
264. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (adopting the elements of
sexual harassment claims from Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05); see also Avery,
supra note 79, at 5.
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den on the defendant to bring forth evidence that is unlikely to be
accessible to it. Ultimately, this is where the pattern or practice
sexual harassment claim fails.
Moreover, failing to apply this presumption and burden shift
does not solve the problem. In Jenson, the court recognized that
bifurcation of a sexual harassment class action does not operate as
neatly as it does for other types of Title VII litigation. 265 Ordinar-
ily, in a traditional pattern or practice class action the class of
plaintiffs must prove that the discrimination was the "standard
operating procedure" of the employer. 26 6 If the plaintiffs prove
their case, there is a presumption that every member of the plain-
tiff class was subject to discrimination. 267 This shifts the burden to
the defendant in phase two of the litigation to show that an indi-
vidual plaintiff was not affected by the conduct of the employer
and should not be entitled to relief.
In Jenson, the Court articulated a different framework from
that in Mitsubishi, Dial and other Title VII cases. The Court held
that the burden is not shifted to the defendant in the second phase
of the trial. As previously discussed, the first phase in Jenson was
analyzed the same as in Mitsubishi and Dial, by asking whether
the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of exposing women
to a sexually hostile environment that was objectively so severe or
pervasive that it would change the terms or conditions of employ-
ment from the perspective of a reasonable person.268 In Jenson,
however, the court took a different approach than those courts
when applying the burden of persuasion in the second phase.269
The court in Jenson held that a finding of liability in the first
phase
does not entitle every member of the plaintiff class to a
presumption that they were sexually harassed - the bur-
den of persuasion does not shift to the employer.... In-
stead, the burden of persuasion remains on the individual
class members; each must show by a preponderance of
265. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 875-76 (D.
Minn. 1993).
266. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336
(1976).
267. Id. at 362.
268. See id.; see also discussion supra Part III.
269. See discussion supra Part III.
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the evidence that she was as affected as the reasonable
woman.
270
If the burden remains on the plaintiff in the second phase to
show that he or she was subjectively affected, the question then
becomes whether a pattern or practice theory actually accom-
plishes anything in these cases. If there is no presumption that
the employer discriminated against an individual class member
because there was a pattern or practice of discrimination, this
does stop an employee from bypassing an essential element of his
or her sexual harassment claim. However, it also limits the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of a pattern or practice sexual harassment
case because each employee must prove that he or she was as af-
fected as the reasonable person. Therefore, while applying the
presumption and shifting the burden may be inherently unfair to
defendants who lack the available evidence to prove individual
plaintiffs' subjective states of mind, failing to apply the presump-
tion may nullify the reasons courts chose to allow pattern or prac-
tice proof in sexual discrimination cases in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Despite the inherently individualized nature of sexual har-
assment claims, some federal trial courts have held that a pattern
or practice theory is an appropriate framework for pursuing
claims of sexual harassment. This extension of a pattern or prac-
tice theory has resulted in substantial settlements over the past
few years between employers and classes of plaintiffs claiming
that they have been victims of sexual harassment at their work-
place.271 Historically, class claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 have been well-suited to treatment under a
pattern or practice scheme. However, sexual harassment claims
are unique forms of Title VII litigation due to their inherently in-
dividualized nature. These claims do not fit as neatly into a pat-
tern or practice framework as do other types of Title VII litigation.
There are a number of problems with bringing pattern or
practice claims of sexual harassment. These include: (1) whether
the private class actions can meet the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) whether it is appropriate
270. Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 876.
271. See supra note 4.
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to treat sexual harassment claims as a class action considering the
distinct individuality of sexual harassment claims where a plain-
tiff must prove that there was an objectively hostile work envi-
ronment and that he or she was subjectively affected by the sexual
harassment; and (3) whether it is appropriate to shift the burden
to the defendant in the second phase of a sexual harassment pat-
tern or practice case and, if it is not appropriate to shift the bur-
den, whether a pattern or practice framework is an efficient and
effective means of bringing sexual harassment cases at all. Be-
cause of these problems, sexual harassment claims should not be
brought using a pattern or practice scheme.
The term "sexual harassment class action" is an oxymoron.
The very nature of a sexual harassment claim dictates that it
should be litigated on an individual basis. The essential elements
of the sexual harassment claim "demand individualized treat-
ment."272 The individualized treatment that is necessary for sexual
harassment claims dictates that a pattern or practice framework
is not an appropriate means to pursue claims of sexual harass-
ment. The precedent set by the federal trial courts extending a
pattern or practice theory of liability should not be followed and
the precedent should not be widely adopted. When considering the
inherently individualized nature of sexual harassment claims and
all of the procedural problems as a whole, it is evident that a pat-
tern or practice theory of liability is not an appropriate framework
for bringing sexual harassment claims.
Timothy G. Healy
272. Willner et al., supra note 1, at 158.
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